Teresa Scassa - Blog

On July 31, 2019 the Ontario Government released a discussion paper titled Promoting Trust and Confidence in Ontario’s Data Economy. This is the first in a planned series of discussion papers related to the province’s ongoing Data Strategy consultation. This particular document focuses on the first pillar of the strategy: Promoting Trust and Confidence. The other pillars are: Creating Economic Benefit; and Enabling Better, Smarter Government. The entire consultation process is moving at lightning speed. The government plans to have a final data strategy in place by the end of this calendar year.

My first comment on the document is about timing. A release on July 31, with comments due by September 6, means that it hits both peak vacation season and mad back to school rush. This is not ideal for gathering feedback on such an important set of issues. A further timing issue is the release of this document and the call for comments before the other discussion papers are available. The result is a discussion paper that considers trust and confidence in a policy vacuum, even though it makes general reference to some pretty big planned changes to how the public sector will handle Ontarians’ personal information as well as planned new measures to enable businesses to derive economic benefit from data. It would have been very useful to have detailed information about what the government is thinking about doing on these two fronts before being asked what would ensure ongoing trust and confidence in the collection, use and disclosure of Ontarians’ data. Of course, this assumes that the other two discussion documents will contain these details – they might not.

My second comment is about the generality of this document. This is not a consultation paper that proposes a particular course of action and seeks input or comment. It describes the current data context in broad terms and asks questions that are very general and open-ended. Here are a couple of examples: “How can the province help businesses – particularly small and medium-sized businesses – better protect their consumers’ data and use data-driven practices responsibly?” “How can the province build capacity and promote culture change concerning privacy and data protection throughout the public sector (e.g., through training, myth-busting, new guidance and resources for public agencies)?” It’s not that the questions are bad ones – most of them are important, challenging and worth thinking about. But they are each potentially huge in scope. Keep in mind that the Data Strategy that these questions are meant to inform is to be released before the end of 2019. It is hard to believe that anything much could be done with responses to such broad questions other than to distil general statements in support of a strategy that must already be close to draft stage.

That doesn’t mean that there are not a few interesting nuggets to mine from within the document. Currently, private sector data protection in Ontario is governed by the federal Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act. This is because, unlike Alberta, B.C. and Quebec, Ontario has not enacted a substantially similar private sector data protection law. Is it planning to? It is not clear from this document, but there are hints that it might be. The paper states that it is important to “[c]larify and strengthen Ontario’s jurisdiction and the application of provincial and federal laws over data collected from Ontarians.” (at p. 13) One of the discussion questions is “How can Ontario promote privacy protective practices throughout the private sector, building on the principles underlying the federal government’s private sector privacy legislation (the Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act)?” Keep in mind that a private member’s bill was introduced by a Liberal backbencher just before the last election that set out a private sector data protection law for Ontario. There’s a draft text already out there.

Given that this is a data strategy document for a government that is already planning to make major changes to how public sector data is handled, there are a surprising number of references to the private sector. For example, in the section on threats and risks of data-driven practices, there are three examples of data breaches, theft and misuse – none of which are from Ontario’s public sector. This might support the theory that private sector data protection legislation is in the offing. On the other hand, Ontario has jurisdiction over consumer protection; individuals are repeatedly referred to as “consumers” in the document. It may be that changes are being contemplated to consumer protection legislation, particularly in areas such as behavioural manipulation, and algorithmic bias and discrimination. Another question hints at possible action around online consumer contracts. These would all be interesting developments.

There is a strange tension between public and private sectors in the document. Most examples of problems, breaches, and technological challenges are from the private sector, while the document remains very cagey about the public sector. It is this cageyness about the public sector that is most disappointing. The government has already taken some pretty serious steps on the road to its digital strategy. For example, it is in the process of unrolling much broader sharing of personal information across the public sector through amendments to the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act passed shortly after the election. These will take effect once data standards are in place (my earlier post on these amendments is here). The same bill enacted the Simpler, Faster, Better, Services Act. This too awaits regulations setting standards before it takes effect (my earlier post on this statute is here). These laws were passed under the public radar because they were rushed through in an omnibus budget bill and with little debate. It would be good to have a clear, straightforward document from the government that outlines what it plans to do under both of these new initiatives and what it will mean for Ontarians and their personal data. Details of this kind would be very helpful in allowing Ontarians to make informed comments on trust and confidence. For example, the question “What digital and data-related threats to human rights and civil liberties pose the greatest risk for Ontarians” (p. 14) might receive different answers if readers were prompted to think more specifically about the plans for greater sharing of personal data across government, and a more permissive approach to disclosures for investigatory purposes (see my post on this issue here).

The discussion questions are organized by category. Interestingly, there is a separate category for ‘Privacy, Data Protection and Data Governance’. That’s fine – but consider that there is a later category titled Human Rights and Civil Liberties. Those of us who think privacy is a human right might find this odd. It is also odd that the human rights/civil liberties discussion is separated from data governance since they are surely related. It is perhaps wrong to read too much into this, since the document was no doubt drafted quickly. But thinking about privacy as a human right is important. The document’s focus on trust and confidence seems to relegate privacy to a lower status. It states: “A loss of trust reduces people’s willingness to share data or give social license for its use. Likewise, diminishing confidence impedes the creative risk-taking at the heart of experimentation, innovation and investment.” (at p. 8) In this plan, protection of privacy is about ensuring trust which will in turn foster a thriving data economy. The fundamental question at the heart of this document is thus not: ‘what measures should be taken to ensure that fundamental values are protected and respected in a digital economy and society”. Rather, it is: ‘What will it take to make you feel ok about sharing large quantities of personal information with business and government to drive the economy and administrative efficiencies?’ This may seem like nitpicking, but keep in mind that the description of the ‘Promoting Trust and Confidence’ pillar promises “world-leading, best-in-class protections that benefits the public and ensures public trust and confidence in the data economy” (page 4). Right now, Europe’s GDPR offers the world-leading, best-in-class protections. It does so because it treats privacy as a human right and puts the protection of this and other human rights and civil liberties at the fore. A process that puts feeling ok about sharing lots of data at the forefront won’t keep pace.

Published in Privacy
Friday, 19 July 2019 09:15

Open Banking in Canada - A Primer

I wrote a short paper on Open Banking in Canada for a presentation I gave to the Digital Strategy Committee of the Board of Directors of Vancity, a Vancouver-based credit union.  The text of this paper is available by clicking on "read more" and/or downloading the PDF attachment below.

Smart city data governance has become a hot topic in Toronto in light of Sidewalk Labs’ proposed smart city development for Toronto’s waterfront. In its Master Innovation Development Plan (MIDP), Sidewalk Labs has outlined a data governance regime for “urban data” that will be collected in the lands set aside for the proposed Sidewalk Toronto smart city development. The data governance scheme sets out to do a number of different things. First, it provides a framework for sharing ‘urban data’ with all those who have an interest in using this data. This could include governments, the private sector, researchers or civil society. Because the data may have privacy implications, the governance scheme must also protect privacy. Sidewalk Labs is also proposing that the governance body be charged with determining who can collect data within the project space, and with setting any necessary terms and conditions for such collection and for any subsequent use or sharing of the data. The governance body, named the Urban Data Trust (UDT), will have a mandate to act in the public interest, and it is meant to ensure that privacy is respected and that any data collection, use or disclosure – even if the data is non-personal or deidentified – is ethical and serves the public interest. They propose a 5-person governance body, with representation from different stakeholder communities, including “a data governance, privacy, or intellectual property expert; a community representative; a public-sector representative; an academic representative; and a Canadian business industry representative” (MIDP, Chapter 5, p. 421).

The merits and/or shortcomings of this proposed governance scheme will no doubt be hotly debated as the public is consulted and as Waterfront Toronto develops its response to the MIDP. One thing is certain – the plan is sure to generate a great deal of discussion. Data governance for data sharing is becoming an increasingly important topic (it is also relevant in the Artificial Intelligence (AI) context) – one where there are many possibilities and proposals and much unexplored territory. Relatively recent publications on data governance for data sharing include reports by Element AI, MaRS, and the Open Data Institute). These reflect both the interest in and the uncertainties around the subject. Yet in spite of the apparent novelty of the subject and the flurry of interest in data trusts, there are already many different existing models of data governance for data sharing. These models may offer lessons that are important in developing data governance for data sharing for both AI and for smart city developments like Sidewalk Toronto.

My co-author Merlynda Vilain and I have just published a paper that explores one such model. In the early 2000’s the Ontario government decided to roll out mandatory smart metering for electrical consumption in the province. Over a period of time, all homes and businesses would be equipped with smart meters, and these meters would collect detailed data in real time about electrical consumption. The proposal raised privacy concerns, particularly because detailed electrical consumption data could reveal intimate details about the activities of people within their own homes. The response to these concerns was to create a data governance framework that would protect customer privacy while still reaping the benefits of the detailed consumption data.

Not surprisingly, as the data economy surged alongside the implementation of smart metering, the interest in access to deidentified electrical consumption data grew across different levels of government and within the private sector. The data governance regime had therefore to adapt to a growing demand for access to the data from a broadening range of actors. Protecting privacy became a major concern, and this involved not just applying deidentification techniques, but also setting terms and conditions for reuse of the data.

The Smart Metering Entity (SME), the data governance body established for smart metering data, provides an interesting use case for data governance for data sharing. We carried out our study with this in mind; we were particularly interested in seeing what lessons could be learned from the SME for data governance in other context. We found that the SME made a particularly interesting case study because it involved public sector data, public and private sector stakeholders, and a considerable body of relatively sensitive personal information. It also provides a good example of a model that had to adapt to changes over a relatively short period of time – something that may be essential in a rapidly evolving data economy. There were changes in the value of the data collected, and new demands for access to the data by both public and private sector actors. Because of the new demand and new users, the SME was also pushed to collect additional data attributes to enrich the value of its data for potential users.

The SME model may be particularly useful to think about in the smart cities context. Smart cities also involve both public and private sector actors, they may involve the collection of large volumes of human behavioural data, and this gives rise to a strong public interest in appropriate data governance. Another commonality is that in both the smart metering and smart cities contexts individuals have little choice but to have their data collected. The underlying assumption is that the reuse and repurposing of this data across different contexts serves the public interest in a number of different ways. However, ‘public interest’ is a slippery fish and is capable of multiple interpretations. With a greatly diminished role for consent, individuals and communities require frameworks that can assist not just in achieving the identified public interests – but in helping them to identify and set them. At the same time protecting individual and community privacy, and ensuring that data is not used in ways that are harmful or exploitative.

Overall, our study gave us much to think about, and its conclusion develops a series of ‘lessons’ for data governance for data sharing. A few things are worthy of particular note in relation to Sidewalk Labs’ proposed Urban Data Trust. First, designing appropriate governance for smart metering data was a significant undertaking that took a considerable amount of time, particularly as demands for data evolved. This was the case even though the SME was dealing only with one type of data (smart metering data), and that it was not responsible for overseeing new requests to collect new types of data. This is a sobering reminder that designing good data governance – particularly in complex contexts – may take considerable time and resources. The proposed UDT is very complex. It will deal with many different types of data, data collectors, and data users. It is also meant to approve and set terms and conditions for new collection and uses. The feasibility of creating robust governance for such a complex context is therefore an issue – especially within relatively short timelines for the project. Defining the public interest – which both the SME and the UDT are meant to serve – is also a challenge. In the case of the SME, the democratically elected provincial government determines the public interest at a policy level, and it is implemented through the SME. Even so, there are legitimate concerns about representation and about how the public interest is defined. With the UDT, it is not clear who determines the public interest or how. There will be questions about who oversees appointments to the UDT, and how different stakeholders and their interests are weighted in its composition and in its decision-making.

Our full paper can be found in open access format on the website of the Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI): here.

 

Published in Privacy

In June 2019, the Standing Senate Committee on Banking, Trade and Commerce (BANC) released its report on open banking following hearings it held in the spring of 2019. The federal government, which has been conducting its own consultation into open banking, has yet to issue a report.

For those who have not been following discussions around this issue, ‘open banking’ refers to a framework that enables consumers to share their personal financial data with financial services providers in a secure manner. The anticipated benefits of open banking include providing consumers of financial services (both individuals and small businesses) with more and better financial planning and payment options, and stimulating innovation in the fintech sector. Open banking is no small undertaking. To work, it will require major financial institutions to adopt standardized formats for data. It will also require the adoption of appropriate security measures. A regulator will have to create a list of approved open banking fintech providers. There will also need to be oversight from competition and privacy commissioners. For consumer privacy to be adequately protected there will have to be an overhaul of Canada’s Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act.

The BANC committee report reviews the testimony it heard and makes a number of recommendations. It begins by noting that approximately 4 million Canadians already make use of fintech apps to obtain financial services not otherwise available. These apps require users to provide their banking usernames and passwords in order to enable them to repeatedly access and screen-scrape financial data. It is a risky practice and one that may violate the terms of service for those customer accounts, leaving consumers vulnerable and unprotected. The Senate report notes that the legal and regulatory changes needed to implement open banking in Canada – as well as the necessary work on standards and interoperability – will take time. As a result, the first part of the report makes a number of recommendations to address, in the short term, the protection of Canadians who engage in screen-scraping.

The BANC committee notes that other countries – including Australia and the UK – are already further ahead than Canada in launching open banking initiatives. It expresses concern that Canada may be falling behind what is an international shift towards open banking, noting that “without swift action, Canada may become an importer financial technology rather than an exporter” (at pr. 14). The report makes a number of recommendations to facilitate the adoption of open banking in Canada, urging a “principles-based, industry-led open banking framework that would be integrated with existing financial sector and privacy legislation” (Recommendation III). The recommendations include work on developing standards, creating a registry of accredited providers of fintech services, legislating limits on the use of standardized and interoperable consumer financial data, creating a framework in which provincially regulated credit unions and caisses populaires can participate, improving broadband access for rural and remote communities, reforming PIPEDA, and creating appropriate regulatory oversight and enforcement mechanisms.

The BANC committee correctly links open banking to a broader data portability right. This portability right, which is present in the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), is one of the 10 principles articulated in the federal government’s new Digital Charter. The federal government’s recent discussion paper on PIPEDA reform also references data portability. Data portability is a mechanism by which individuals are given much greater control over their data – allowing them to ‘port’ their data from one provider to another. It also has potential to encourage competition and to stimulate innovation in the tech sector. However, for the BANC committee, consumer control is at the heart of open banking. The Committee clearly sees open banking as something that should benefit consumers. They characterize it as giving consumers more control over their personal financial information, and something that can provide them with a “more personalized, convenient digital banking experience” (at p. 37).

Indeed, the BANC committee report as a whole places consumer interests at the centre of the move towards open banking. As noted earlier, its first recommendations are oriented towards taking action to protect consumers who are engaging in screen-scraping to obtain the fintech services they want. It is also sharply critical of the federal government for not appointing a consumer advocate to its Advisory Committee on Open Banking, even though the Department of Finance indicates that it has consulted widely to obtain consumer and civil society input. The BANC committee expressed concern that not enough is known about the potential impacts on consumers of open banking, and recommends that more research be carried out as soon as possible on these issues, funded by the federal government.

 

Published in Privacy

On May 21, 2019, Canada’s federal government launched its Digital Charter, along with several other supporting documents, including its action plan for the Charter and proposals for modernizing the Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act (PIPEDA). Together, the documents discuss the outcomes of the recent federal digital strategy consultation and chart a path forward for federal policy in this area. The documents reflect areas where the government is already forging ahead, and they touch on a number of issues that have been at the centre of media attention, as well as public and private sector engagement.

As a strategy document (which, launched less than six months away from an election, it essentially is) the Digital Charter hits many of the right notes, and its accompanying documentation reveals enough work already underway to give shape to its vision and future directions. Navdeep Bains, the Minister of Innovation, Science and Economic Development, describes the Digital Charter as articulating principles that “are the foundation for a made in Canada digital approach that will guide our policy thinking and actions and will help to build an innovative, people-centred and inclusive digital and data economy.”

The Digital Charter features 10 basic principles. Three relate to digital infrastructure: universal access to digital services; safety and security; and open and modern digital government. Another three touch on human rights issues: data and digital for good; strong democracy; and freedom from hate and violent extremism. Two principles address data protection concerns: control and consent; and transparency, portability and interoperability — although the latter principle blends into the marketplace and competition concerns that are also reflected in the principle of ensuring a level playing field. Perhaps the most significant principle in terms of impact is the tenth, an overarching commitment to strong enforcement and real accountability. Weak enforcement has undermined many of our existing laws that apply in the digital context, and without enforcement or accountability, there is little hope for a credible strategy. Taken together, the 10 principles reflect a careful and thorough synthesis of some of the issues confronting Canada’s digital future.

Yet, this digital charter might more accurately be described as a digital chart. In essence, it is an action plan, and while it is both credible and ambitious, it is not a true charter. A charter is a document that creates legal rights and entitlements. The Digital Charter does not. Its principles are framed in terms of open-ended goals: “Canadians will have control over what data they are sharing,” “All Canadians will have equal opportunity to participate in the digital world,” or “Canadians can expect that digital platforms will not foster or disseminate hate, violent extremism or criminal content.” Some of the principles reflect government commitments: “The Government of Canada will ensure the ethical use of data.” But saying that some can “expect” something is different from saying they have a right to it.

The goals and commitments in the Digital Charter are far from concrete. That is fair enough — these are complex issues — but concepts such as universal digital access and PIPEDA reform have been under discussion for a long time now with no real movement. A chart shows us the way, but it does not guarantee we’ll arrive at the destination.

It is interesting to note as well that privacy as a right is not squarely a part of the Digital Charter. Although privacy has (deservedly) been a high-profile issue in the wake of the Cambridge Analytica scandal and the controversies over Sidewalk Labs’ proposed smart city development in Toronto, this Digital Charter does not proclaim a right to privacy. A right to be free from unjustified surveillance (by public or private sector actors) would be a strong statement of principle. An affirmation of the importance of privacy in supporting human autonomy and dignity would also acknowledge the fundamental importance of privacy, particularly as our digital economy plows forward. The Digital Charter does address data protection, stating that Canadians will have control over the data they share and will “know that their privacy is protected.” They will also have “clear and manageable access to their personal data.” While these are important data protection goals, they are process-related commitments and are aimed at fostering trust for the purpose of data sharing.

Indeed, trust is at the the core of the government strategy. Minister Bains makes it clear that, in his view, “innovation is not possible without trust.” Further, “trust and privacy are key to ensuring a strong, competitive economy and building a more inclusive, prosperous Canada.”

Privacy, however, is the human right; trust is how data protection measures are made palatable to the commercial sector. Trust is about relationships — in this case, between individuals and businesses and, to some extent, between individuals and governments. In these relationships, there is a disparity of power that leaves individuals vulnerable to exploitation and abuse. A trust-oriented framework encourages individuals to interact with businesses and government — to share their data in order to fuel the data economy. This is perhaps the core conundrum in creating digital policy in a rapidly shifting and evolving global digital economy: the perceived tension between protecting human rights and values on the one hand, and fostering a competitive and innovative business sector on the other. In a context of enormous imbalance of power, trust that is not backed up by strong, enforceable measures grounded in human rights principles is a flimsy thing indeed.

And this, in a nutshell, is the central flaw in an otherwise promising Digital Charter. As a road map for future government action, it is ambitious and interesting. It builds on policies and actions that are already underway, and sets a clear direction for tackling the many challenges faced by Canada and Canadians in the digital age. It presents a pre-election digital strategy that is in tune with many of the current concerns of both citizens and businesses. As a charter, however, it falls short of grounding the commitments in basic rights and enshrining values for our digital future. That, perhaps, is a tall order and it may be that a transparent set of principles designed to guide government law and policy making is as much as we can expect at this stage. But calling it a Charter misleads, and creates the impression that we have done the hard work of articulating and framing the core human rights values that should set the foundational rules for the digital society we are building.

Published in Privacy

On May 3, 2019 I was very pleased to give a keynote talk at the Go Open Data 2019 Conference in Toronto (video recordings of the conference proceedings are now available from the site). The following post includes the gist of my talk, along with hyperlinks to the different sources and examples I referenced. My talk was built around the theme of the conference: Inclusive, Equitable, Ethical, and Impactful.

In my talk this morning I am going to use the conference’s themes of Inclusive, Equitable, Ethical and Impactful to shape my remarks. In particular, I will apply these concepts to data in the smart cities context as this has been garnering so much attention lately. But it is also important to think about these in the artificial intelligence (AI) context which is increasingly becoming part of our everyday interactions with public and private sector actors, and is a part of smart cities as well.

As this is an open data conference, it might be fair to ask what smart cities and AI have to do with open data. In my view, these contexts extend the open data discussion because both depend upon vast quantities of data as inputs. They also complicate it. This is for three broad reasons:

First, the rise of smart cities means that there are expanding categories and quantities of municipal data (and provincial) that could be available as open data. There are also growing quantities of private sector data gathered in urban contexts in a variety of different ways over which arguments for sharing could be made. Thus, there is more and more data and issues of ownership, control and access become complex and often conflictual. Open government data used to be about the operations and activities of government, and there were strong arguments for making it broadly open and accessible. But government data is changing in kind, quality and quantity, particularly in smart cities contexts. Open data may therefore be shifting towards a more nuanced approach to data sharing.

Second, smart cities and AI are just two manifestations of the expanding demand for access to data for multiple new uses. There is not just MORE data, there are more applications for that data and more demand from public, private sector and civil society actors for access to it. Yet the opacity of data-hungry analytics and AI contribute to a deepening unease about data sharing.

Third, there is a growing recognition that perhaps data sharing should not be entirely free and open. Open data, under an open licence, with few if any restrictions and with no registration requirement was a kind of ideal, and it fit with the narrower concept of government data described earlier. But it is one that may not be best suited to our current environment. Not only are there potential use restrictions that we might want to apply to protect privacy or to limit undesirable impacts on individuals or communities, but there might also be arguments for cost recovery as data governance becomes more complex and more expensive. This may particularly be the case if use is predominantly by private sector actors – particularly large foreign companies. The lack of a registration requirement limits our ability to fully understand who is using our data, and it reduces the possibility of holding users to account for misuse. Again this may be something we want to address.

I mentioned that I would use the themes of this conference as a frame for my comments. Let me start with the first – the idea of inclusiveness.

Inclusive

We hear a lot about inclusiveness in smart cities – and at the same time we hear about privacy. These are complicated and intertwined.

The more we move towards using technology as an interface for public and private sector services, for interaction with government, for public consultations, elections, and so on, the more we need to focus on the problem of the digital divide and what it means to include everyone in the benefits of technology. Narrowing the digital divide will require providing greater access to devices, access to WIFI/broadband services, access to computer and data literacy, and access in terms of inclusiveness of differently-abled individuals. These are all important goals, but their achievement will inevitably have the consequence of facilitating the collection of greater quantities and more detailed personal information about those formerly kept on the other side of the digital divide. The more we use devices, the more data we generate. The same can be said of the use of public WIFI. Moving from analog to digital increases our data exhaust, and we are more susceptible to tracking, monitoring, profiling, etc. Consider the controversial LinkNYC Kiosks in New York. These large sidewalk installations include WiFi Access, android tablets, charging stations, and free nation-wide calling. But they have also raised concerns about enhanced tracking and monitoring. This is in part because the kiosks are also equipped with cameras and a range of sensors.

No matter how inclusiveness is manifested, it comes with greater data collection. The more identifiable data collected, the greater the risks to privacy, dignity, and autonomy. But de-identified data also carries its own risks to groups and communities. While privacy concerns may prompt individuals to share less data and to avoid data capture, the value of inclusiveness may actually require having one’s data be part of any collection. In many ways, smart cities are about collecting vast quantities of data of many different kinds (including human behavioural data) for use in analytics in order to identify problems, understand them, and solve them. If one is invisible in the data, so are one’s particular needs, challenges and circumstances. In cases where decisions are made based on available data, we want that data to be as complete and comprehensive as possible in order to minimize bias and to make better diagnoses and decisions. Even more importantly, we want to be included/represented in the data so that our specificity is able to influence outcomes. Inclusiveness in this sense is being counted, and counting.

Yet this type of inclusion has privacy consequences – for individuals as well as groups. One response to this has been to talk about deidentification. And while deidentification may reduce some privacy risks, but it does not reduce or eliminate all of them. It also does not prevent harmful or negative uses of the data (and it may evade the accountability provided by data protection laws). It also does not address the dignity/autonomy issues that come from the sense of being under constant surveillance.

Equitable and Ethical

If we think about issues of equity and ethics in the context of the sharing of data it becomes clear that conventional open data models might not be ideal. These models are based on unrestricted data sharing, or data sharing with a bare minimum of restrictions. Equitable and ethical data sharing may require more restrictions to be placed on data sharing – it may require the creation of frameworks for assessing proposed uses to which the data may be put. And it may even require changing how access to data is provided.

In the privacy context we have already seen discussion about reforming the law to move away from a purely consent-based model to one in which there may be “no-go zones” for data use/processing. The idea is that if we can’t really control the collection of the information, we should turn our attention to identifying and banning certain inappropriate uses. Translated into the data sharing context, licence agreements could be used to put limits on what can be done with data that is shared. Some open data licences already explicitly prohibit any attempts to reidentify deidentified data. The Responsible Data Use Assessment process created by Sidewalk Labs for its proposed data governance framework for Toronto’s Quayside development similarly would require an ‘independent’ body to assess whether a proposed use of urban data is acceptable.

The problem, of course, is that licence-based restrictions require oversight and enforcement to have any meaning. I wrote about this a couple of years ago in the context of the use of social media data for analytics services provided to police services across North America. The analytics companies contracted for access to social media data but were prohibited in their terms of use from using this data in the way they ultimately did. The problem was uncovered after considerable effort by the ACLU and the Brennan Center for Justice – it was not discovered by the social media companies who provided access to their data or who set the terms of use. In the recent Report of Findings by the Privacy Commissioner of Canada into Facebook’s role in the Cambridge Analytica scandal, the Commissioner found that although Facebook’s terms of service with developers prohibited the kind of activities engaged in by Dr Kogan who collected the data, they failed in their duty to safeguard personal information, and in particular, ignored red flags that should have told them that there was a problem. Let’s face it; companies selling access to data may have no interest in policing the behaviour of their customers or in terminating their access. An ‘independent’ body set up to perform such functions may lack the resources and capacity to monitor and enforce compliance.

Another issue that exists with ethical approaches is, of course, whose ethics? Taking an ethical approach does not mean being value-neutral and it does not mean that there will not be winners and losers. It is like determining the public interest – an infinitely malleable concept. This is why the composition of decision-making bodies and the location of decision-making power, when it comes to data collection and data sharing, is so important and so challenging.

Impactful

In approaching this last of the conference’s themes – impactful – I think it is useful to talk about solutions. And since I am almost out of time and this is the start of the day’s events, I am going to be very brief as solutions will no doubt be part of the broader discussion today.

The challenges of big data, AI and smart cities have led to a broad range of different proposed data governance solutions. Some of these are partial; for example, deidentification/anonymization or privacy by design approaches address what data is collected and how, but they do not necessarily address uses.

Some are aspirational. For example, developing ethical approaches to AI such as the Montreal Declaration for a Responsible Development of Artificial Intelligence. Others attempt to embed both privacy and ethics into concrete solutions – for example the federal Directive on Automated Decision-Making for the public sector, which sets parameters for the adoption, implementation and oversight of AI deployment in government. In addition, there are a number of models emerging, including data trusts in all their variety (ODI), or bottom-up solutions such as Civic Data Trusts (see, e.g.: MaRS, Element AI, SeanMcDonald), which involve access moderated by an independent (?), representative (?) body, in the public interest (?) according to set principles.

Safe sharing sites is another concept discussed by Lisa Austin and David Lie of the University of Toronto – they are not necessarily independent of data trusts or civic data trusts. Michel Girard is currently doing very interesting work on the use of data standards (see his recent CIGI paper).

Some solutions may also be rooted in law reform as there are deficiencies in our legal infrastructure when it comes to data governance. One key target of reform is data protection laws, but context-specific laws may also be required.

Many of these solutions are in the debate/discussion/development stage. Without a doubt there is a great deal of work to be done. Let’s start doing it.

 

 

Published in Privacy

On April 25 the federal Privacy Commissioner and the Privacy Commissioner of British Columbia released a joint Report of Findings in an investigation into Facebook’s handling of personal information in relation to the Cambridge Analytica scandal. Not surprisingly, the report found that Facebook was in breach of a number of different obligations under the Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act (PIPEDA). Somewhat more surprisingly, the Report also finds that the corresponding obligations under BC’s Personal Information Protection Act (PIPA) were also breached. The Report criticizes Facebook for being less than fully cooperative in the investigation. It also notes that Facebook has disputed the Commissioners’ findings and many of their recommendations. The Report concludes by stating that each Commissioner will “proceed to address the unresolved issues in accordance with our authorities” under their respective statutes. Since the federal Commissioner has no order-making powers, the next step for him will be the Federal Court seeking a court order to compel changes. This will be a hearing de novo – meaning that the same territory will be covered before the Court, and Facebook will be free to introduce new evidence and argument to support its position. The court will owe no deference to the findings of the Privacy Commissioner. Further, while the Federal Trade Commission in the US contemplates fines to impose on Facebook in relation to its role in this scandal, Canada’s Commissioner does not have such a power, nor does the Federal Court. This is the data protection law we have – it is not the one that we need. Just as the Cambridge Analytica scandal drew attention to the dynamics and scale of personal data use and misuse, this investigation and its outcomes highlight the weaknesses of Canada’s current federal data protection regime.

As for the BC Commissioner – he does have order making powers under PIPA, and in theory he could order Facebook to change its practices in accordance with the findings in the Report. What the BC Commissioner lacks, however, with all due respect, is jurisdiction, as I will discuss below.

While the substantive issues raised in the complaint are important and interesting ones, this post will focus on slightly less well-travelled territory. (For comment on these other issues see, for example, this op-ed by Michael Geist). My focus is on the issue of jurisdiction. In this case, the two Commissioners make joint findings about the same facts, concluding that both statutes are breached. Although Facebook challenges their jurisdiction, the response, in the case of the BC Commissioner’s jurisdiction is brief and unsatisfactory. In my view, there is no advantage to Canadians in having two different data protection laws apply to the same facts, and there is no benefit in a lack of clarity as to the basis for a Commissioner’s jurisdiction.

This investigation was carried out jointly between the federal and the BC Privacy Commissioner. There is somewhat of a BC nexus, although this is not mentioned in the findings. One of the companies involved in processing data from Facebook is Aggregate IQ, a BC-based analytics company. There is an ongoing joint investigation between the BC and federal Privacy Commissioners into the actions of Aggregate IQ. However, this particular report of findings is in relation to the activities of Facebook, and not Aggregate IQ. While that other joint investigation will raise similar jurisdictional questions, this one deals with Facebook, a company over whose activities the federal Privacy Commissioner has asserted jurisdiction in the past.

There is precedent for a joint investigation of a privacy complaint. The federal privacy commissioners of Australia and Canada carried out a joint investigation into Ashley Madison. But I that case each Commissioner clearly had jurisdiction under their own legislation. This, I will argue, is not such a case. Within Canada, only one privacy Commissioner will have jurisdiction over a complaint arising from a particular set of facts. In this case, it is the federal Privacy Commissioner.

Unsurprisingly, Facebook raised jurisdictional issues. It challenged the jurisdiction of both commissioners. The challenge to the federal Commissioner’s jurisdiction was appropriately dismissed – there is a sufficient nexus between Facebook and Canada to support the investigation under PIPEDA. However, the challenge to the jurisdiction of the BC Commissioner was more serious. Nevertheless, it was summarily dismissed in the findings.

Uneasiness about the constitutional reach of PIPEDA in a federal state has meant that the law, which relies on the federal trade and commerce power for its constitutional legitimacy, applies only in the context of commercial activity. It applies across Canada, but it carves out space for those provinces that want to enact their own data protection laws to assert jurisdiction over the intra-provincial collection, use and disclosure of personal information. To oust PIPEDA in this sphere, these laws have to be considered “substantially similar” to PIPEDA (s. 26(2)(b)). Three provinces – BC, Alberta and Quebec, have substantially similar private sector data protection laws. Even within those provinces, PIPEDA will apply to the collection, use or disclosure by federally-regulated businesses (such as banks or airline companies). It will also apply to cross-border activities by private sector actors (whether international or inter-provincial). This split in jurisdiction over privacy can be complicated for individuals who may not know where to direct complaints, although the different commissioners’ offices will provide assistance. This does not mean there is no room for collaboration. The federal and provincial Commissioners have taken common positions on many issues in the past. These instances are conveniently listed on the website of Alberta’s privacy commissioner.

What has happened in this case is quite different. This is described as a joint investigation between the two Commissioners, and it has resulted in a joint set of recommendations and findings. Both PIPEDA and BC’s PIPA are cited as being applicable laws. In response to the challenge to the BC Privacy Commissioner’s jurisdiction, the Report tersely states that “PIPA (Personal Information Protection Act (British Columbia)) applies to Facebook’s activities occurring within the province of BC”. Yet no information is given as to what specific activities of Facebook were exclusively within the province of BC. No distinction is made at any point in the report between those activities subject to PIPA and those falling under PIPEDA. In this respect, it seems to me that Facebook is entirely correct in challenging the BC Privacy Commissioner’s jurisdiction. Facebook collects, uses and discloses personal information across borders, and its activities with respect to Canadians are almost certainly covered by PIPEDA. If that is the case, then they are not also subject to PIPA. The Exemption Order that finds PIPA BC to be substantially similar to PIPEDA provides:

1. An organization, other than a federal work, undertaking or business, to which the Personal Information Protection Act, S.B.C. 2003, c. 63, of the Province of British Columbia, applies is exempt from the application of Part 1 of the Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act, in respect of the collection, use and disclosure of personal information that occurs within the Province of British Columbia.

Section 3(2) of the Personal Information Protection Act provides:

(2) This Act does not apply to the following:

(c) the collection, use or disclosure of personal information, if the federal Act applies to the collection, use or disclosure of the personal information;

The “federal Act” is defined in s. 1 of PIPA to mean PIPEDA. The scheme is quite simple: if PIPEDA applies then PIPA does not. If the federal Commissioner has jurisdiction over the activities described in the Report, the provincial Commissioner does not. The only way in which the BC Commissioner would have jurisdiction is if there are purely local, provincial activities of Facebook that would not be covered by PIPEDA. Nothing in the Findings suggests that there are. At a minimum, if there are separate spheres of legislative application, these should be made explicit in the Findings.

Jurisdictional issues matter. We already have a complex mosaic of different data protection laws (federal, provincial, public sector, private sector, health sector) in Canada. Individuals must muddle through them to understand their rights and recourses; while organizations and entities must likewise understand which laws apply to which of their activities. Each statute has its own distinct sphere of operation. We do not need the duplication that would result from the adjudication of the same complaint under two (or more) different statutes; or the confusion that might result from different results flowing from different complaint resolutions. If there are separate sets of facts giving rise to separate breaches under different statutes, this has to be spelled out.

Federal-provincial cooperation on data protection is important; it is also valuable for the different privacy commissioners to reach consensus on certain principles or approaches. But creating overlapping jurisdiction over complaints flies in the face of the law and creates more problems than it solves. We have enough data protection challenges to deal with already.

Published in Privacy

A recent decision on a motion before the Federal Court marks the progress of the Privacy Commissioner’s reference case on whether the Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act (PIPEDA) includes a right to be forgotten. In an earlier report following the OPC’s consultation on digital reputation, the Privacy Commissioner had indicated that he was of the view that PIPEDA, in its unamended form, provided for a right to be forgotten that could be exercised against search engines.

The reference, launched on October 10, 2018, is linked to a complaint filed with the Office of the Privacy Commissioner (OPC) by an individual against Google. The Complainant is concerned that Google searches of his name produce links to news articles that he alleges “are outdated and inaccurate and disclose sensitive information such as his sexual orientation and a serious medical condition” (at para 6). The complainant’s view is that by providing prominent links to these articles, Google is breaching the PIPEDA. He is seeking to have these results de-indexed. This means that they would no longer appear in Google search results. De-indexing does not involve the removal of content from the source websites. Basically, the articles would still be out there, but they would not appear in Google search results. Unless similar orders were made against other search engines such as Bing, they content would be findable using those engines.

The Commissioner has referred two questions to the Federal Court. First, he seeks to know whether Google’s search engine activities constitute the “commercial activity” necessary to bring these activities within the scope of PIPEDA, which applies to the collection, use or disclosure of personal information in the course of commercial activity. The second question is whether Google’s search engine activities, even if commercial, fall within the exception to PIPEDA’s application where personal information is collected, used or disclosed “for journalistic, artistic or literary purposes and for no other purpose” (s. 4(2)(c)). Google and the Attorney General of Canada were given notice of the reference and are entitled to become parties to the reference. Google has challenged the scope of the reference. It seeks to add the question of whether, if PIPEDA does apply to the search engine’s activities, and if there is a deindexing order, such an order would violate s. 2(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. This motion to expand the scope of the reference had not yet been heard.

The CBC, along with a coalition of other Canadian media organizations brought motions seeking to be added as parties to the original reference. Their concern is that the Commissioner’s interpretation of the scope of PIPEDA as including a right to be forgotten is a violation of the freedom of expression guaranteed by s. 2(b) of the Charter. Their argument is based on the principle that the right of expression includes the right to receive information, and that measures taken to limit access to information in the news media thus breach the Charter. By bringing their motion, the media outlets sought to be added as parties, with the right to introduce evidence and make argument before the Court.

The motion was heard by Prothonotary Tabib, who rendered her decision on March 1. She began by noting that since the motion was being heard prior to any decision on Google’s motion to expand the scope of proceedings, party status would be considered only with respect to the original reference questions. She was critical of the motion on the basis that it proceeded “from the fundamental assumption that the Court’s determination of the jurisdictional questions in a way that confers jurisdiction on the OPC to investigate the underlying complaint will inevitably result in deindexing lawful news media content from Internet search results” (at para 17). She noted that in fact the reference questions were directed towards the issue of whether the Commissioner had jurisdiction in the matter. If the outcome of the reference was a finding that there was jurisdiction, the Commissioner would still have to investigate, would have to find the complaint well-founded, and would have to determine whether de-indexing was an appropriate remedy. The Commissioner can only make non-binding orders, so no Charter rights would be violated unless the matter proceeded to a recommendation to de-index with which Google voluntarily complied. If Google refused to comply the complainant or the Commissioner could bring the matter to Federal Court seeking a binding order, but the Court would hold a hearing de novo and might reach different conclusions. Basically, the prothonotary was of the view that the matter was a long way from breaching anyone’s Charter rights. She noted that “The media parties’ reliance on assumptions as to the ultimate result to form the cornerstone of their argument conflates all subsequent steps and determinations into the preliminary issue” (at para 18).

Prothonotary Tabib considered Rule 104(1)(b) of the Federal Courts Rules, which empowers the Court to order a person to be joined as a party. She focused on the issue of whether the presence of the media parties was necessary “for a full and effectual determination” of all of the issues in the reference. The media companies argued that their presence was necessary since the results of the reference would be binding on them. Prothonotary Tabib noted:

 

The media parties’ arguments thus essentially rest on the underlying assumption that what is truly at issue in this reference is the constitutionality of the Privacy Commissioner "“intended”" institution of a deindexing process in respect of lawful news content from Internet search results. However, as determined above, that is not what is truly at issue in this reference. What is at issue here is only whether Google is subject to or exempt from the application of Part 1 of PIPEDA in respect of how it collects, uses or discloses personal information in the operation of its search engine service when it presents search results in response to an individual’s name. (at para 36)

 

She observed that the only direct effect of the outcome of the reference would be the Commissioner’s decision to proceed with the investigation of the complaint against Google. She also noted that any freedom of expression impact that might ultimately flow from this matter would be shared by all internet content providers, as well as all those who used Google’s search engines. If the Charter interests of the media entitled them to be parties, then there was virtually no limit to who could be a party – which would be an absurd and unmanageable result. In her view it would be more appropriate for the media companies to seek intervenor status. However, she found that their motion did not address the issues they would need to establish for intervenor status. In brief, they failed to show how their contributions to the argument would be distinct from what Google would provide as party to the reference case. The motions were dismissed, with leave provided for the companies to reapply for leave to intervene once Google’s motion to vary the scope of the reference is decided.

 

 

Published in Privacy

As discussed in my earlier posts here and here, Ontario’s new budget bill contains quite a number of measures related to digital, data and privacy issues. In this third post I look at the proposed new statute that will balance privacy with the openness of provincial tribunal adjudicative records.

This new statute responds to the decision in Toronto Star v. AG Ontario, discussed in an earlier post here, in which Justice Morgan of the Ontario Supreme Court ruled that Ontario’s Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act (FIPPA) breached the right to freedom of expression under s. 2(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. It did so because of the way in which it applied to administrative tribunals in respect of requests for access to their adjudicative records. Some tribunals to which FIPPA applied required those seeking access to adjudicative records to file access to information requests. What breached the Charter right was the presumption in FIPPA that personal information could not be disclosed unless one of the statutory exceptions applied. This was found to clash with the open courts principle. Justice Morgan suspended the declaration of invalidity of the legislation for one year in order to give the government time to fix the problem. The year is up later this month; it is therefore not surprising that this legislative change has found its way into the omnibus bill.

The Tribunal Adjudicative Records Act, 2019 provides, as a default principle, that the adjudicative records of tribunals prescribed by regulations enacted under this statute are to be made available to the public (s. 2(1)). The definition of adjudicative records in s. 1(2) is quite broad and includes transcripts of oral evidence, documents admitted in evidence, and reasons for decision. Adjudicative records expressly do not include personal notes or draft decisions, or records related to attempts to resolve matters through alternative dispute resolution procedures.

The obligation to disclose adjudicative records will be subject to any confidentiality orders that the tribunal might make (s. 2(2)). A confidentiality order in relation to personal information can be issued where:

2(3)(b) intimate financial or personal matters or other matters contained in the record are of such a nature that the public interest or the interest of a person served by avoiding disclosure outweighs the desirability of adhering to the principle that the record be available to the public.

A confidentiality order may be applied for by a party to the proceedings or by a person who would be affected by the disclosure of the information at issue (s. 2(3)).

Section 3(1) gives tribunals the authority to make rules governing their own procedures relating to providing access or issuing confidentiality orders. Under s. 4, tribunals are, with ministerial permission, entitled to charge fees for access to their adjudicative records. The new statute also provides for consequential amendments to FIPPA that will exclude the application of that statute to “personal notes, draft decisions, draft orders and communications related to draft decisions or draft orders that are created by or for a person who is acting in a quasi-judicial capacity. It also excludes the application of FIPPA to adjudicative records covered by the new statute.

This new statute resolves the constitutional issues at the heart of the Toronto Star decision. It does not, however, resolve other issues related to privacy and administrative tribunal decisions that have long been the subject of debate and discussion. In a recent Ontario case, for example, the personal information of third parties to a matter before the Ontario Human Rights Tribunal ended up in the tribunal’s decision. While the new Tribunal Adjudicative Records Act will allow third parties to apply for confidentiality orders, it is not clear how such individuals will know in advance that their personal information might be published. Further, many administrative tribunals deal with highly sensitive matters involving personal health or financial information. While they are urged to take privacy into account in the drafting of their decisions and in the amount of personal information shared, the trend towards providing broader access through online publication of decisions is leading to greater privacy risks for individuals that may not be properly balanced against the open courts principle. It would have been good to see in this new statute some recognition of the importance of these issues. Administrative tribunals are not courts, and government would not unduly interfere with their independence by stating in law that the disclosure of personal information should be minimized to only that which is clearly necessary to explain the reasons for decision, or by limiting the disclosure of some personal information in versions of decisions published online.

Published in Privacy

Schedule 31 and Schedule 41 of Ontario’s new omnibus Budget Bill amend the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act (FIPPA) and the Municipal Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act (MFIPPA) respectively. One change to both statutes will expand the ability of public sector bodies to share personal information with law enforcement without consent. A more extensive set of amendments to FIPPA constitute another piece of the government’s digital and data strategy, which is further developed in the Simpler, Faster, Better Services Act, another piece of the budget bill discussed in my post here.

FIPPA and MFIPPA set the rules for the collection, use and disclosure of personal information by the public sector. MFIPPA applies specifically to municipalities, and FIPPA to the broader public sector. Both statutes prohibit the disclosure of personal information under the custody or control of a public body unless such a disclosure falls under an exception. Currently, both statutes have an exception related to investigations which reads:

(g) if disclosure is to an institution or a law enforcement agency in Canada to aid an investigation undertaken with a view to a law enforcement proceeding or from which a law enforcement proceeding is likely to result;

The Budget Bill will amend this exception by replacing it with:

(g)  to an institution or a law enforcement agency in Canada if,

(i)  the disclosure is to aid in an investigation undertaken by the institution or the agency with a view to a law enforcement proceeding, or

(ii)  there is a reasonable basis to believe that an offence may have been committed and the disclosure is to enable the institution or the agency to determine whether to conduct such an investigation;

Paragraph (g)(i) is essentially the same as the original provision. What is new is paragraph (g)(ii). It broadens the circumstances in which personal information can be shared with law enforcement. Not only that, it does so in the squishiest of terms. There must be a reasonable basis to believe that an offence may have been committed. This is different from a reasonable basis to believe that an offence has been committed. Not only does it lower the threshold in the case of individuals, it may also open the door to the sharing of personal information for law enforcement fishing expeditions. After all, if enough people file for certain benefits, it might be reasonable to believe that an offence may have been committed (there’s always someone who tries to cheat the system, right?). The exception could enable the sharing of a quantity of personal information to permit the use of analytics to look for anomalies that might suggest the commission of on offence. The presence of this amendment in an omnibus budget bill that will receive very little scrutiny or debate contradicts the government’s own statement, in its announcement of its data strategy consultation, that “Data privacy and protection is paramount.” This is not a privacy-friendly amendment.

The other set of amendments to FIPPA contained in the budget bill are aimed at something labelled “data integration”. This is a process meant to allow government to derive greater value from its stores of data, by allowing it to generate useful data, including statistical data, to government and its departments and agencies. It allows for the intra-governmental sharing of data for preparing statistics for the purposes of resource management or allocation, as well as the planning and evaluation of the delivery of government funded programs and services, whether they are funded “in whole or in part, directly or indirectly” (s. 49.2(b)).

Because these amendments contemplate the use of personal information, there are measures specifically designed to protect privacy. For example, under s. 49.3, personal information is not to be used for data integration unless other data will not serve the purpose, and no more personal information shall be used than is reasonably necessary to meet the purpose. Public notice of the indirect (i.e. not directly from the individual) collection of personal information must be provided under s. 49.4. Any collection of personal information can only take place after data standards provided for in s. 49.14 have been approved by the Privacy Commissioner (s. 49.5). Once collected, steps must be taken to deidentify the personal information. The amendments include a definition of deidentification, which involves the removal of direct identifiers as well as any information “that could be used, either alone or with other information, to identify an individual based on what is reasonably foreseeable in the circumstances” (s. 49.1). Section 49.8 specifically prohibits anyone from using or attempting to use “information that has been identified under this Part, either alone or with other information, to identify an individual”.

Provision is made for the disclosure of personal information collected through the data integration scheme in limited circumstances – this includes the unfortunately worded exception discussed above where “there is a reasonable basis to believe that an offence may have been committed”. (s. 49.9(c)(ii)).

In terms of transparency, a new s. 49.10 provides for notice to be published on a website setting out information about any collection of personal information by a ministry engaged in data integration. The information provided must include the legal authority for the collection; the type of personal information that may be collected; and the information sources, the purpose of any collection, use or disclosure, as well as the nature of any linkages that will be made. Contact information must also be provided for someone who can answer any questions about the collection, use or disclosure of the personal information. Contact information must also be provided for the Privacy Commissioner. Data standards developed in relation to data integration must also be published (s. 49.14(2)), and any data integration unit that collections personal information must publish an annual report setting out prescribed information (s. 49.13).

Section 49.11 mandates the safe storage and disposal of any personal information, and sets retention limits. It also provides for data breach notification to be made to affected individuals as well as to the Commissioner. The Commissioner has the power, under s. 49.12 to review the practices and procedures of any data integration unit if the Commissioner “has reason to believe that the requirements of this Part are not being complied with”. The Commissioner has power to make orders regarding the discontinuance or the modification of practices or procedures, and can also order the destruction of personal information or require the adoption of a new practice or procedure.

The amendments regarding data integration are clearly designed to facilitate a better use of government data for the development and delivery of programs and services and for their evaluation. These are important measures and seem to have received some careful attention in the amendments. Once again, however, these seem to be important pieces of the data strategy for which the government has recently launched a consultation process that seems to be becoming more irrelevant by the day. Further, as part of an omnibus budget bill, these measures will not receive much in the way of discussion or debate. This is particularly unfortunate for two reasons. First, as the furore over Statistics Canada’s foray into using personal information to generate statistical data shows, transparency, public input and good process are important. Second, the expansion of bases on which personal information shared with government can be passed along to law enforcement merits public scrutiny, debate and discussion. Encroachments on privacy slipped by on the sly should be particularly suspect.

Published in Privacy
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